Part II:
Current US strategy (a general overview)
This comes directly from the White Paper released by the White House (from whitehouse.gov):
"• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.
• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that
serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal
security, with limited international support.
• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.
• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.
• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN."
These goals seem ideal, but are untenable at the moment. I will go through these point by point:
- Terrorist networks: Al Qaeda operatives are extraordinarily elusive, and the Taliban insurgency has gained in strength and size since 2008. Currently, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, is pursuing negotiations with the Taliban for a greater protection of Afghanistan from Al Qaeda insurgents. The U.S. has not engaged in these negotiations, as these negotiations would seem to be both self-destructive and murky in their possible results. The United States government does not trust the Taliban, as they are a non-state actor and are not accountable under any laws.
- Government in Afghanistan: This is a contentious and confusing issue, as the U.S. continually berates the Karzai government with accusations of corruption (which may be well-founded; see the August 2009 elections) and negligence. The U.S. has also supported tribal militias, often paying them upwards of 1$ million for their assistance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. This is a multi-faceted problem: each tribe has its own interest in Afghanistan and not every tribe is sympathetic towards the Karzai government. Along with that is the fact that many civilians view the tribes unfavorably, as the tribes often have very little sympathy for accident casualties of war. Arming them now may mean an unstable, war-plagued Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves.
- Afghan security forces: The U.S. wants to build-up the Afghan Army and police up to 134,000 and 82,000 in the next year, which is an extremely unrealistic number. The current number of combat-ready servicemen stands at 60,000 with turnover at only 25%. Also, this is an uphill struggle ideologically: al Qaeda and the Taliban purport to defend the highest Muslim ethics and are often more lucrative enterprises than joining the armed forces.
- Government in Pakistan: This is a troubling issue; though the United States does require Pakistan's help with Afghanistan, intervening too much in Pakistan may cast the United States with the visage of puppeteer. With current President Zardari's approval numbers sinking faster than the Titanic, any U.S. intervention that is intended to change the political sphere in Pakistan would turn whatever support there is against the United States. Pakistanis are a highly proud people, as they showed during the vehement protests against former President Musharraf. The U.S. should allow the citizens of Pakistan to change their government democratically, without any outside assistance.
- International community: Afghanistan is a terribly difficult area for any international access aside from military. With its multiple tribal militias, rampant corruption, an extremely low education level and a growing anti-occupational mindset, other international assistance is difficult to garner.
Part III will have my opinion on what strategy the U.S. should execute in Afghanistan. It might be long enough to split into two parts; if it is, don't worry. I won't name the last part "Attack of the Clones."
Das Flüg
I can not tell from this post whether you are trying to criticize the goals as they are set forth, or you are merely trying to say they are difficult but nonetheless the goals the United States should pursue.
ReplyDelete"These goals seem ideal, but are untenable at the moment." Well yes, that is why they are GOALS and not FACTS.
So my question is: are you critiquing the current goals as stated by the US government? Or are you critiquing the strategy and tactics being used to achieve them? This is a fundamental question. If it is the former, then I look forward to your framework on the goals the U.S. should be trying to achieve; If it is the later, then you did not adequately critique the current strategy in this post - you only critiqued the goals. (Meaning that your next post should not only be the strategy the U.S. should execute, but also a statement about why the current strategy is not favorable).
I am mainly critiquing the goals set forth by the administration, and partly the past actions of the U.S.
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion, the U.S. took the wrong road in Afghanistan at the beginning of operations and, unfortunately, Obama has only altered Bush's goals by a small amount. I'll write up my opinion on what the U.S. should have done and can still do in Afghanistan in between studying for voracious midterms.