Afghani War, Part II: The Empire Strikes Back

^Good one, eh?

Part II:
Current US strategy (a general overview)
This comes directly from the White Paper released by the White House (from whitehouse.gov):
"• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that
serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal
security, with limited international support.

• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN."

These goals seem ideal, but are untenable at the moment. I will go through these point by point:

• Terrorist networks: Al Qaeda operatives are extraordinarily elusive, and the Taliban insurgency has gained in strength and size since 2008. Currently, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, is pursuing negotiations with the Taliban for a greater protection of Afghanistan from Al Qaeda insurgents. The U.S. has not engaged in these negotiations, as these negotiations would seem to be both self-destructive and murky in their possible results. The United States government does not trust the Taliban, as they are a non-state actor and are not accountable under any laws.
• Government in Afghanistan: This is a contentious and confusing issue, as the U.S. continually berates the Karzai government with accusations of corruption (which may be well-founded; see the August 2009 elections) and negligence. The U.S. has also supported tribal militias, often paying them upwards of 1$ million for their assistance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. This is a multi-faceted problem: each tribe has its own interest in Afghanistan and not every tribe is sympathetic towards the Karzai government. Along with that is the fact that many civilians view the tribes unfavorably, as the tribes often have very little sympathy for accident casualties of war. Arming them now may mean an unstable, war-plagued Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves.
• Afghan security forces: The U.S. wants to build-up the Afghan Army and police up to 134,000 and 82,000 in the next year, which is an extremely unrealistic number. The current number of combat-ready servicemen stands at 60,000 with turnover at only 25%. Also, this is an uphill struggle ideologically: al Qaeda and the Taliban purport to defend the highest Muslim ethics and are often more lucrative enterprises than joining the armed forces.
• Government in Pakistan: This is a troubling issue; though the United States does require Pakistan's help with Afghanistan, intervening too much in Pakistan may cast the United States with the visage of puppeteer. With current President Zardari's approval numbers sinking faster than the Titanic, any U.S. intervention that is intended to change the political sphere in Pakistan would turn whatever support there is against the United States. Pakistanis are a highly proud people, as they showed during the vehement protests against former President Musharraf. The U.S. should allow the citizens of Pakistan to change their government democratically, without any outside assistance.
• International community: Afghanistan is a terribly difficult area for any international access aside from military. With its multiple tribal militias, rampant corruption, an extremely low education level and a growing anti-occupational mindset, other international assistance is difficult to garner.

Part III will have my opinion on what strategy the U.S. should execute in Afghanistan. It might be long enough to split into two parts; if it is, don't worry. I won't name the last part "Attack of the Clones."

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A matter of sternness

It has been a decently long time since I last posted anything related to politics, so I suppose I'll get back on track with that and keep myself in practice. This will be about military strategy in Afghanistan.

I won't be presumptuous and say that this is the best strategy for the United States to follow, but it is the one that would likely foster the most ideal results.

Part 1 (of however many parts)
Current predicaments:
Currently in Afghanistan, the United States is fielding near 70,000 troops on the ground. As of recently, they have been working to isolate the Taliban (and subsequently, al Qaeda) to the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and have been waging successful campaign against al Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Waziristan, a mountainous region in northern Pakistan. The United States fields the vast majority of troops in Afghanistan, with Canada fielding around 3,000 and Germany around 1,000. Recently, Pakistani intelligence (ISI) has captured two top-tier Taliban leaders; however, there are several problems that go along with this.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the ISI have been working with a tenuous relationship to further secure Afghanistan. The two agencies are distrustful of each other, as many in the American government have the view that Pakistan wants to keep some of the Taliban tangible in order to exert a greater influence in Afghanistan after American forces leave. There has also been suspicion on the side of the ISI that several anti-Pakistani militants who have been killed of late (according to the ISI) may have been American spies. Along with this is the ever-prevalent Pakistani fear that the Americans are secretly working with the Indian government to somehow undermine Pakistan. At this time, the relationship is professional and far from intimate.
This war is also relatively unpopular at home, as with its counterpart war in Iraq. As of January 12th, according to a CBS poll, only 46% of respondents approved of his handling of Afghanistan, opposed to upwards of 60% in the late summer of 2009. This is typical in any war, however, as popular opinion for a war typically wanes with an increase in troop deaths. Obama's announcement of a troop surge did not help his poll numbers, as is typical with an engagement of this length. Many people attribute the two wars as having some part in the current economic downturn (though the current proposed budget has $159.3 billion for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq out of a total $3.8 trillion).
This war (both wars, in my opinion) has been poorly handled since former president Bush authorized military operations in Afghanistan. There are a plethora of different, less-lethal strategies that the United States could have pursued and could still pursue, many of which would reduce the number of American and Afghani deaths and foster cooperation and give a positive view of America in the Muslim world. I will go in-depth into one of these strategies in my next segment, Part II.

That's all for now,
Das Flüg