Quick üpdate!

Because of massive amounts of book-reading and endless self-torture by academic practices, I have had little time to rant about something in my blog. Thus, here is a quick update:
1. Chechen rebels bombed a Russian train station, killing 38+.
2. A South Korean vessel sank in North Korean waters; many are missing.
3. Obama continues to negotiate with Russian president Medvedev for a reduction in nuclear arms.
4. I'm still single.
5. Lady Gaga is still annoying.
6. Sarah Palin is still annoying.
7. Dick Cheney is still searching for his heart.
8. The Texan school board dismissed an appeal to include Oscar Romero in the teaching curriculum, mostly because of the reason that, as quoted from Patricia Hardy, "I guarantee you most of you did not know who Oscar Romero was" and "I just happen to think it's not [important]."
-By the way, I would appreciate it if everyone would e-mail Ms. Hardy and chastise her a bit for her extraordinary ignorance. Oscar Romero was a great man of peace and human rights, and he deserves to never be forgotten. Use this e-mail address to contact the Texas school board: sboesupport@tea.state.tx.us
9. Baseball season starts soon. Hopefully, the Mets won't upset me. Again.

That's all for now,
Das Flüg

I'll See You In Health!

I would like to thank Sir Dr. Stephen T. Colbert, D.F.A., for that quote.

As you (yes, you again, my only reader) probably know (since you're so vigilant with the news and all), one of Barack Obama's campaign promises has finally fallen through: the passage of health care reform. *Cue applause*

This isn't the bill that I was hoping for, but it is a necessary first step. Even Dennis Kucinich, one of the most liberal Representatives in the House changed his vote from a "no" to a "yes" because he realized that some kind of reform, however minor, was necessary. Kucinich and I both were hoping for the public option to be available- the ability of a citizen to have his health care provided by the government and not have to pay any cost for treatment- but, perhaps this is a first step. Either way, it is quite momentous.

I find it astounding that so many people charge this with being a "government takeover of health care" and a "foray into Socialism," but neither is even remotely close to the truth. Firstly, the general notion of health care provided to each and every citizen regardless of socio-economic status has become accepted as a universal right. (Though it seems that people like Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin would disagree.) Almost every industrialized and modernized nation, to my knowledge, has some sort of universal health care system in place. I certainly don't see France, England, Germany, Japan, and even the Czech Republic as "Socialist." In fact, this bill simply extends Medicare benefits for those who cannot afford their own insurance plans or are not covered by their employers (typically small businesses with less than 50 people). It seems almost unconscionable that the United States doesn't have such a system in place already, though, there is always Medicare and Medicaid...
Secondly, some people seem to forget the exact definition of "Socialism." Socialism, in the technical sense, literally means that the government controls production of all products exported and sold by and in the country. That's it. The term should not be conflated with Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, Chairman Mao, or Liberal Neo-Monarchists (in the words of Mitt Romney). The health care plan is simply the government acting in the best interests of the people, especially the poor and disenfranchised. To be led on by the raging right's fear mongering would by irrational and completely absurd.

FDR once said that every American has the right to health care. In this new day, we are one step closer to that.

That's all for now,
Das Flüg

Afghan War, Part III: Return of the Jedi

Now that my midterm week is over and I have some time to relax, I thought it prudent to update my blog with the final part of my analysis of the war in Afghanistan. This part will be my opinion of a viable improvement to the current strategy.

The strategy:
2010 is becoming a bloody year for troop deaths in Afghanistan. There have been 74 American deaths (icasualties.org) in the first 3 months of combat which, if figures continue in the current trend, leads to approximately 230 American troops killed in the 2010 year (accounting for 12 months of full combat). The troop surge enacted by the president may kill members of al Qaeda and the Taliban, but it certainly won't end the war.
There are several key components to winning a war against a non-state actor; one of the ingredients is the use of combat troops on the ground, but the largest fight should be for the support of the Afghani people as a whole and the creation of a stable Afghanistan. I'll dole this out in bullet form:

• Reduce the number of troops to below 100,000; for the strategy I will propose, this number is more than sufficient.
• Industrialize the nation- Afghanistan suffers from an inordinately high unemployment rate of 40% (according to CIA World Factbook). That 40% is extremely attractive to al Qaeda and the Taliban, as both can promise that those who fight will be well compensated for their actions and their families will be taken care of. A possible solution to reducing the unemployment rate would be to offer incentives to companies that can build factories and offer other types of low-training jobs in the less affluent regions of Afghanistan. Reducing the number of available soldiers for the insurgent groups is a key component to success. Also, troops should be divided into even contingents to protect the new workforce, as these new industries will be a tempting target.
• Public works- This is both a source of employment and a necessity to Afghanistan. The Taliban left the country in shambles after many years of rule, and many parts of the country lack the simple amenities that most countries in the first world take for granted. The beautification of the country not only improves standard of living, but also improves morale and raises the pride of the average citizen. If, suddenly, a building is attacked by the Taliban which had been built by 50 native Afghanis, then the public would turn against the Taliban overwhelmingly.
• Schools- Schools are of the utmost importance to success in Afghanistan and building them should be one of the top priorities for the US strategy. Building schools and hiring teachers and faculty would not only bolster employment, but would allow for a new generation of Afghanis to spurn the Taliban and al Qaeda. The current literacy rate, as reported by UNICEF, is 28%, which is well below any current standard. Teaching children at least the basics of society, mathematics, and literature would make them more informed and educated. Children are typically targets for indoctrination by militants, and educating them would be the best solution. The issue of books for these schools can be solved simply by having schools in industrialized nations across the world donate their old (but not outdated) textbooks. I know from personal experience that many schools put old textbooks in storage; they might as well be used.
• Hospitals- This might seem obvious, but Afghanistan is in dire need of hospitals and doctors. Doctors in Doctors Without Borders are always willing to insert themselves in dangerous situations and help those in need.
  
• Farms-The opium trade in Afghanistan is ghastly. It is extremely profitable, but it deters from American progress in the country. This is possibly the one of the more haphazard problems, as almost no farmers are willing to give up their opium crop. Somewhat luckily (for farmers, not for those in need), food prices are continually rising, especially in the wakes of the recent earthquakes in Chile, Haiti, Taiwan and Turkey. With some convincing, supplying of resources and lessons in horticulture, farmers in Afghanistan could instead grow food staples. This would also enliven Afghanistan's economy.
• Military action- Continue pushing al Qaeda and the Taliban towards Pakistan, and with increased Pakistani support, military operations would be more effective. The military must also be cognizant of the insurgent groups hiding among villages of civilians, lest they be reckless and culpable for the deaths of non-combatants. The insurgents are the perceived enemy by all, and that perception must stick.
• Tribes- Don't pay them to fight the war. The US might end up funding another al Qaeda by providing weapons to tribes which have no accountability under the Afghan government.
• The Afghan army- Training a new army and police force is tedious but necessary. The recruits need to be educated, or else the army will suffer from a severe case of abandonment.
  

• Pakistan- One of the larger pieces to the puzzle is Pakistan. They have recently arrested Taliban leaders, likely holding them until the United States removes its troops. Pakistan wants to utilize the Taliban, according to numerous reports, as a resource to use against India. This is why the constant influx of funding from the United States into Pakistan should come with a catch: Islamabad will only receive funding if troops are diverted from the Indian border to the Afghan border. This would serve to hopefully ease tensions between India and Pakistan, whose relationship has been less than genial. Doing this would likely convey the message that Pakistan does not plan to attack India in any way; hopefully the Indian government will accept this message and could be a first step towards a more amiable relationship between the two. Either way, both countries have nuclear weapons, so a war is somewhat unlikely (though not impossible). Diverting troops would also make military action against the Taliban and al Qaeda more efficient and effective.

These solutions act to build the country from the ground-up. The country will likely become more efficacious, more unified, and relatively free of a corrupt government. With an educated and overwhelmingly employed populace, the insurgent groups will likely become less able to recruit new soldiers. Over time, the groups will likely evaporate completely. This is a strategy that will unfold over time, since no winning formula can be achieved in the short-term. Let's just hope that someone is listening.

I am willing to hear any comments/questions/criticisms to my opinion. Ask away!

That's all for now,
Das Flüg

Afghani War, Part II: The Empire Strikes Back

^Good one, eh?

Part II:
Current US strategy (a general overview)
This comes directly from the White Paper released by the White House (from whitehouse.gov):
"• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that
serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal
security, with limited international support.

• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN."

These goals seem ideal, but are untenable at the moment. I will go through these point by point:

• Terrorist networks: Al Qaeda operatives are extraordinarily elusive, and the Taliban insurgency has gained in strength and size since 2008. Currently, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, is pursuing negotiations with the Taliban for a greater protection of Afghanistan from Al Qaeda insurgents. The U.S. has not engaged in these negotiations, as these negotiations would seem to be both self-destructive and murky in their possible results. The United States government does not trust the Taliban, as they are a non-state actor and are not accountable under any laws.
• Government in Afghanistan: This is a contentious and confusing issue, as the U.S. continually berates the Karzai government with accusations of corruption (which may be well-founded; see the August 2009 elections) and negligence. The U.S. has also supported tribal militias, often paying them upwards of 1$ million for their assistance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. This is a multi-faceted problem: each tribe has its own interest in Afghanistan and not every tribe is sympathetic towards the Karzai government. Along with that is the fact that many civilians view the tribes unfavorably, as the tribes often have very little sympathy for accident casualties of war. Arming them now may mean an unstable, war-plagued Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves.
• Afghan security forces: The U.S. wants to build-up the Afghan Army and police up to 134,000 and 82,000 in the next year, which is an extremely unrealistic number. The current number of combat-ready servicemen stands at 60,000 with turnover at only 25%. Also, this is an uphill struggle ideologically: al Qaeda and the Taliban purport to defend the highest Muslim ethics and are often more lucrative enterprises than joining the armed forces.
• Government in Pakistan: This is a troubling issue; though the United States does require Pakistan's help with Afghanistan, intervening too much in Pakistan may cast the United States with the visage of puppeteer. With current President Zardari's approval numbers sinking faster than the Titanic, any U.S. intervention that is intended to change the political sphere in Pakistan would turn whatever support there is against the United States. Pakistanis are a highly proud people, as they showed during the vehement protests against former President Musharraf. The U.S. should allow the citizens of Pakistan to change their government democratically, without any outside assistance.
• International community: Afghanistan is a terribly difficult area for any international access aside from military. With its multiple tribal militias, rampant corruption, an extremely low education level and a growing anti-occupational mindset, other international assistance is difficult to garner.

Part III will have my opinion on what strategy the U.S. should execute in Afghanistan. It might be long enough to split into two parts; if it is, don't worry. I won't name the last part "Attack of the Clones."

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